Printers
Printer DNS and network access in dc1
This project owns printer DNS declarations and network access. The
DNS root publishes the canonical declaration.
The service configuration permits Wi-Fi access to printer1.
The MikroTik accounts root owns its RouterOS
account and Vault credential. Printer firmware and print queues are unmanaged.
The existing printer records and firewall rule have been adopted into this
project’s state. The migration receipt records their
preserved identities and the owning validation commands.
Network
The diagram source describes the checked-in topology.
The printer connects to the router over the wired LAN; its DNS name resolves
directly to the printer. Wi-Fi access uses the printer-only firewall exception.


1.1 - Printer1 state migration
Completed on 2026-11-07. The existing DNS records and firewall rule are now
owned by the printers project, with unchanged live identities and matches.
The deployment receipt
records the operations and verification evidence. No printer record or
firewall rule was destroyed or recreated.
Current ownership
//infra/printers/dns owns both printer DNS views through the printers
AppRole’s tf_backend/dns backend.//infra/printers/tf owns the Wi-Fi exception through its tf_backend/tf
backend and dedicated RouterOS credential.//infra/mikrotik/accounts owns the printers account and generated Vault
credential, using the operator-supplied MikroTik administrator secret.//infra/mikrotik/tf retains router, switch and bare-metal DNS records.
It no longer owns printer DNS. The former firewall backend has no bindings.
The MikroTik AppRole no longer has the ingress-secret read policy. The
printers identity cannot read the administrator credential. Do not restore
old deployment jobs or run the former source revision against its old state;
that source would attempt to recreate objects whose bindings have moved.
Verification
With explicit authority for live review, use the normal text plans:
bazel run //infra/printers/dns:tf.plan
bazel run //infra/printers/tf:tf.plan
bazel run //infra/mikrotik/accounts:tf.plan
bazel run //infra/mikrotik/dns:tf.plan
All should report no resource changes. Check the existing firewall rule still
precedes the enabled terminal forward drop. Its place_before attribute is
creation-only and cannot be reconstructed by import; source ignores updates
to that attribute while retaining guarded insertion for newly created rules.
Rollback
A rollback requires separate authority and a reviewed plan. Freeze both
writers, restore declarations in the intended owner, remove only the exact
current bindings, and import the verified existing objects into that owner’s
backend. Never delete live records or the rule merely to move ownership, and
never keep two active state bindings for one object. If an import fails, keep
writers stopped and restore the binding before allowing an apply.
Use an owning state-only wrapper authenticated by the appropriate owner
AppRole; the old firewall backend is still available for controlled recovery.
Do not revive an ingress-credential dependency to access it. Its temporary
migration target and selector were removed after the empty-state check.
Keep credentials in Vault and retain only sanitized summaries of any recovery.
2 - Printer DNS
This DNS-only root manages the canonical printer declaration
through the shared DNS module. Printer1 retains printer1.dc1.alwaldend.com,
its private IPv4 address, and both dc1 and global DNS views. Public resolution
does not provide a route to the printer. Records remain unproxied.
The tf=dns wrapper selects src_infra_printers, the shared DNS provider
credentials, and the owner’s tf_backend/dns Vault HTTP backend. It does not
use the printers firewall account. DNS management defaults to enabled to
preserve the existing records adopted through the completed
state transfer. Both views retain their original
provider identities.
Run offline formatting, pinned-provider schema validation and declaration checks:
bazel test //infra/printers/dns:tf_tests.fmt_test \
//infra/printers/dns:tf_tests.validate_test //infra/dns:config_test
Operational targets use //infra/printers/dns:tf.<operation> and require explicit
live authority. Expected reconciliation after adoption is no DNS changes.
3 - Printer network access
This root defines the printer1 IPv4 forwarding exception on router1. Clients
in 192.168.2.0/24 arriving on Wi-Fi bridge2 may reach the printer through
wired bridge1. The destination comes from printer1_a in the canonical
declaration. All IPv4 services on that host are included;
other wired destinations do not match. The printer needs stable addressing
and a return gateway through 192.168.1.1.
The rule precedes the enabled forward drop with comment drop forward.
Planning fails unless exactly one such drop matches. The existing rule’s
tf[infra/mikrotik/firewall] comment is retained as its deployed identifier,
avoiding an incidental router update during state adoption. No router export
or unrelated firewall rule is applied. Existing connection tracking handles
replies; manual rule reordering requires another order check.
place_before is creation-only in the pinned provider and is not returned by
RouterOS on import. Its updates are ignored after creation so adopting an
existing rule does not replace it. New rules still use the guarded insertion
point; verify actual ordering after adoption or manual firewall changes.
Credentials and state
The tf=main wrapper uses the src_infra_printers AppRole and its
tf_backend/tf backend. It injects the RouterOS endpoint from shared infra AL
configuration and the dedicated mikrotik_username and mikrotik_password
fields from secrets/alwaldend.com/vault1/approles/src_infra_mikrotik/printers.
The MikroTik accounts root owns account
creation and rotation; the printers AppRole has only read access to that secret.
Its Vault definition also
grants the DNS credentials used independently by the DNS root.
The state transfer is complete; the existing rule
retains its provider identity.
Operational targets are //infra/printers/tf:tf.<operation> and require explicit
live authority.
The shared injection helper supplies MIKROTIK_HOST, MIKROTIK_USER, and
MIKROTIK_PASSWORD directly to the default RouterOS provider. DNS retains
its separate aliased provider inputs.
Verification
bazel test //infra/printers/tf:tf_tests.fmt_test \
//infra/printers/tf:tf_tests.validate_test
These checks validate formatting and provider schema offline, excluding only
the backend. They do not execute the live drop lookup or verify connectivity.
After an authorized migration, expect a no-change plan and verify the existing
rule still precedes the terminal drop. From a real Wi-Fi client, run:
nslookup printer1.dc1.alwaldend.com 192.168.2.1
curl --connect-timeout 5 --max-time 10 --location --output /dev/null \
--write-out '%{http_code}\n' http://printer1.dc1.alwaldend.com/
Confirm the declared address resolves and the printer page opens, then submit
a test job through its supported print protocol. Retain sanitized acceptance
evidence. Routed access does not relay mDNS or AirPrint discovery across subnets.